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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
I.  Introduction 
 In June of 2011, Kisano Trade & Invest Limited 
(“Kisano”) and Trasteco Ltd. (“Trasteco”), two companies 
owned by Vadim Shulman, filed suit in the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against Dev 
Lemster and his company, Steel Equipment Corp.  The 
complaint alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced 
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), intentional interference 
with contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary 
duty.  After discovering evidence of what Shulman believed 
to be fraud perpetrated by his business partner, Akiva Sapir, 
an amended complaint added Shulman as a plaintiff, Sapir 
and certain of his entities as defendants, and several claims of 
fraud.   
 
 Between then and now, we vacated the grant of a 
preliminary injunction, and the parties moved forward on 
Sapir’s motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a 
claim and on forum non conveniens grounds, the latter motion 
offering Israel as an alternative forum.  The motions were 
referred by the District Court to the Magistrate Judge to issue 
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a Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”).  The R&R 
recommended that the action be dismissed on forum non 
conveniens grounds, reasoning that Israel would be the more 
appropriate forum, and declined to reach the motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, leaving that to be 
addressed, if appropriate, by the Israeli court.  The District 
Court adopted the R&R, and granted the motion to dismiss 
for forum non conveniens “on the understanding that the case 
may be refiled in Israel and that the defendants waived certain 
statute of limitations defenses.”  (A00060.)  Plaintiffs now 
appeal.  We will affirm.   
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), as the underlying 
claim asserts recovery under RICO.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “‘[W]here the court has 
considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and 
where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision 
deserves substantial deference.’”  Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 886 F.2d 628, 631–32 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Lony 
I”) (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 
(1981)) (alteration in original).  Thus, “we do not perform a 
de novo resolution of forum non conveniens issues,” and 
instead review the District Court’s dismissal on grounds of  
forum non conveniens for an abuse of discretion.  Lacey v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1988).   
 
III.  Forum Non Conveniens 
 
 This case, at its core, involves plaintiffs’ allegations of 
numerous claims of fraud—the Warren equipment “fraud,” 
the Trasteco “secret deal,” the Kisano “secret deal,” the 
Plama “secret deal,” the Veolia “secret deal,” and the New 
York real estate “fraud.”  The parties, at great length, have set 
forth those facts that plaintiffs believe, on the one hand, 
support those claims, and defendants believe, on the other, 
defeat them.  At the end of the day, however, the sole issue 
before us for review is the dismissal on grounds of forum non 
conveniens.  We, therefore, will refer only to those facts 
necessary to our analysis of that issue.   
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 Although a plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be 
disturbed, “[w]hen an alternative forum has jurisdiction to 
hear the case, and when trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum 
would ‘establish  . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a 
defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience,’ 
or when the ‘chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of 
considerations affecting the court’s own administrative and 
legal problems,’ the court may, in the exercise of its sound 
discretion, dismiss the case.”   Windt v. Qwest Commc’ns 
Int’l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Koster 
v. (Am.) Lumbermens  Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 
(1947)) (second alteration in original).  We have identified 
the following four factors to guide a district court’s exercise 
of discretion: (1) the amount of deference to be afforded to 
plaintiffs’ choice of forum; (2) the availability of an adequate 
alternative forum where defendants are amenable to process 
and plaintiffs’ claims are cognizable;1 (3) relevant “private 
interest” factors affecting the convenience of the litigants; and 
(4) relevant “public interest” factors affecting the 
convenience of the forum.  See id. at  189–90.   
 
 Private interests to consider include the ease of access 
to sources of proof; ability to compel witness attendance if 
necessary; means to view relevant premises and objects; and 
any other potential obstacle impeding an otherwise easy, cost-
                                                 
1
 Although plaintiffs do not explicitly argue that Israel is not 
an adequate alternative forum, they initially contended, as 
part of their convenience analysis, that Lemster and Steel 
Equipment Corp. would not be amenable to suit in Israel. 
Those defendants, however, have consented to jurisdiction in 
Israel.  See Dahl v. United Techs. Corp., 632 F.2d 1027, 1029 
(3d Cir. 1980) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal on 
condition that defendant consent to Norwegian jurisdiction).  
Parenthetically, it is difficult to ignore the reality that this 
case has really become Shulman versus Sapir, and that the 
other parties, while they may be witnesses or be in control of 
relevant evidence, have receded in importance.  In any event, 
because there is no serious dispute on appeal that Israel does 
not present an adequate alternative forum, we will not further 
address this factor.   
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effective, and expeditious trial.  Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Chimet, S.p.A., 619 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).  Public 
interests include administrative difficulties arising from 
increasingly overburdened courts; local interests in having the 
case tried at home; desire to have the forum match the law 
that is to govern the case to avoid conflict of laws problems 
or difficulty in the application of foreign law; and avoiding 
unfairly burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury 
duty.  Id. (citing Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6).   
 
 A.  Level of Deference  
 We first consider whether the District Court abused its 
discretion in affording plaintiffs’ choice of forum a lesser 
degree of deference than would be accorded a domestic 
plaintiff.  “Ordinarily, a strong presumption of convenience 
exists in favor of a domestic plaintiff’s chosen forum, and this 
presumption may be overcome only when the balance of the 
public and private interests clearly favors an alternate forum.”  
Windt, 529 F.3d at 190.  When a plaintiff is foreign, however, 
the choice of a United States forum “deserves less deference.”  
Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 256; see also Sinochem Int’l Co. v. 
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007) 
(“When the plaintiff’s choice is not its home forum, . . . the 
presumption in the plaintiff’s favor applies with less force, for 
the assumption that the chosen forum is appropriate is in such 
cases less reasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Among other reasons, courts are wary of the potential for 
foreign plaintiffs to seek jurisdiction in the United States 
because the laws may be more favorable to their claims.  See 
Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 249 n.15 (“[D]ismissal may be 
warranted where a plaintiff chooses a particular forum, not 
because it is convenient, but solely in order to . . . take 
advantage of favorable law.”).   
 
 Shulman is an Israeli citizen, Kisano is a Cypriot 
corporation, and Trasteco is a Maltese LLC.  Despite their 
foreign citizenship, they argue that the District Court erred by 
granting lesser deference to their choice of forum because of 
the “equal access” provision of a treaty between the United 
States and Israel which, as relevant here, states: 
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Nationals and companies of either Party shall be 
accorded national treatment and most-favored-
nation treatment with respect to access to the 
courts of justice and to administrative tribunals 
and agencies within the territories of the other 
Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in 
pursuit and in defense of their rights.   
 
(A00553 (U.S.-Isr. Treaty, art. V(1)).)  Plaintiffs invoke 
Blanco v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 997 F.2d 974 
(2d Cir. 1993), as essentially their sole support for the 
proposition that “when a treaty with a foreign nation accords 
its nationals access to our courts equivalent to that provided 
American citizens, identical forum non conveniens standards 
must be applied to such nationals by American courts.”  Id. at 
981.  Acknowledging that a United States-Venezuela treaty 
had an equal access provision, the Second Circuit found that 
“no discount may be imposed upon the plaintiff’s initial 
choice of a New York forum in this case solely because 
[plaintiff] is a foreign corporation.”  Id.  
 
 For several reasons, we reject plaintiffs’ invitation to 
conclude that the equal access provision in the United States-
Israel treaty requires us to find that plaintiffs’ forum choice is 
entitled to the identical deference courts must afford a 
domestic plaintiff.  First, the Second Circuit’s discussion of 
the level of deference owed a foreign plaintiff who is a citizen 
of a country with an “equal access” agreement with the 
United States was dicta.  The court dismissed the action on 
forum non conveniens grounds, notwithstanding the deference 
“owed,” because of the strong private and public factors 
favoring a Venezuelan forum.  Blanco, 997 F.2d at 981; see 
In re Air Crash Near Peixoto de Azeveda, Braz., on Sept. 29, 
2006, 574 F. Supp. 2d 272, 280-81 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding 
that Blanco’s discussion was dicta and holding that foreign 
plaintiff’s forum choice subject to an identical provision is 
afforded “reduced deference”).   
 
 Moreover, Blanco’s reasoning has been significantly 
diminished, if not altogether rejected, by a subsequent Second 
Circuit case.   In that case, the court held that even if a treaty 
entitled plaintiffs “to access American courts on the same 
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terms as American citizens . . . [its] case law does not support 
plaintiffs’ assertion that such a treaty would require that their 
choice of forum be afforded the same deference afforded to a 
U.S. citizen bringing suit in his or her home forum.”  Pollux 
Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 73 (2d 
Cir. 2003).  Rather, “[p]laintiffs are only entitled, at best, to 
the lesser deference afforded a U.S. citizen living abroad who 
sues in a U.S. forum.”  Id.  The Second Circuit noted that the 
touchstone inquiry regarding the level of deference owed a 
plaintiff’s choice of forum is not the “citizenship or residence 
of the parties,” but the convenience of the forum.  Id.  The 
“lesser degree of deference typically afforded foreign 
plaintiffs . . . . is not intended to create difficulties for foreign 
plaintiffs, but is based instead on realistic doubts about the 
ultimate convenience of a foreign plaintiff’s choice to litigate 
in the United States.”  Id.   
 
 The Second Circuit’s more recent discussion of the 
issue is both more persuasive and, more importantly, 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s and our Court’s forum 
non conveniens case law.  As the Supreme Court has 
explained, the presumption in favor of a domestic plaintiff’s 
choice of forum—and the reduced deference owed a foreign 
plaintiff—is based on convenience:  
 
When the home forum has been chosen, it is 
reasonable to assume that this choice is 
convenient.  When the plaintiff is foreign, 
however, this assumption is much less 
reasonable.  Because the central purpose of any 
forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that 
the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff’s 
choice deserves less deference.     
 
Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255-56; see also Windt, 529 F.3d 
at 190-91 (quoting Piper Aircraft and affording lesser 
deference to foreign plaintiffs).  As the Pollux Holding court 
noted, a court considering a motion to dismiss on forum non 
conveniens grounds should not assign “talismanic 
significance to the citizenship or residence of the parties,” but 
should give less deference to a foreign plaintiff’s choice of 
forum because “it would be less reasonable to assume the 
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choice of forum is based on convenience.”  329 F.3d at 73 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lony I, 886 F.2d 
at 634 (“[T]he reason for giving a foreign plaintiff’s choice 
less deference is not xenophobia, but merely a reluctance to 
assume that the choice is a convenient one . . . .”).    
 
 The focus of the deference inquiry in the Supreme 
Court, in this Court, and in the Second Circuit is on 
convenience, not on the particular significance of a party’s 
residence or citizenship or a party’s ability to invoke a United 
States court’s jurisdiction.  That the United States and Israel 
have agreed to open up their judicial gates to their respective 
citizens does nothing to disturb the longstanding presumption 
that a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a United States forum is 
less likely to be motivated by convenience.   See 14D Charles 
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3828.2 
(3d ed. 2007) (“[I]n practice, federal courts generally hold 
that [treaties promising equal access to courts] do not entitle 
foreign plaintiffs to the same deference as United States 
citizens.”).  We, therefore, conclude that the equal access 
provision in the United States-Israel treaty does not change 
our analysis with respect to the degree of deference a district 
court must afford a foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum.   
 
 Of course, foreign plaintiffs “may bolster the amount 
of deference due their choice by making a strong showing of 
convenience.”  Windt, 529 F.3d at 190 (emphasis added).    In 
performing its forum non conveniens inquiry, a district court 
“must assess[, and articulate,] whether the considerable 
evidence of convenience has  . . . overcome any reason to 
refrain from extending full deference to the foreign plaintiff’s 
choice.” Lony I, 886 F.2d at 634.  This is not a precise 
inquiry, but, generally, “the greater the plaintiff’s or the 
lawsuit’s bona fide connection to the United States and to the 
forum of choice and the more it appears that considerations of 
convenience favor the conduct of the lawsuit in the United 
States, the more difficult it will be for the defendant to gain 
dismissal for forum non conveniens.”  Iragorri v. United 
Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001) (footnotes 
omitted).   
 
 The District Court considered the evidence of 
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convenience and concluded that plaintiffs’ choice of forum 
merited only lesser deference.  It did not abuse its discretion 
in so concluding.  In attempting to make a strong showing of 
convenience, plaintiffs point principally to Shulman’s 
dealings with Lemster and Steel Equipment Corp. in 
Pennsylvania, including the Warren deal, his and 
Trasteco/Kisano’s prior business dealings in the United 
States, the existence of key English-speaking witnesses in the 
forum, and his local attorneys’ knowledge of the case.2  The 
District Court, however, concluded that  Shulman and his 
companies’ connections with the United States were not 
particularly extensive or significant.  Other than having some 
business dealings in the United States, such as ownership of 
real estate in New York, and minority ownership in an Ohio 
Steel plant, all managed remotely, Shulman himself has had 
little connection with the United States.  And, although he is 
correct that the wiring of money and the purchase of the 
Warren plant and equipment took place in Pennsylvania, the 
District Court correctly noted that the agency relationship was 
formed in Israel, all negotiations for the Warren deal took 
place in Israel, and most of the conduct for the claims at issue 
took place in Israel.
3
  Moreover, the District Court did not err 
                                                 
2
 Plaintiffs contend that it was error for the District Court to 
consider Shulman’s position in a separate West Virginia case 
in which he argued, in a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, that he did no business there and that it 
would be an unfair burden on him to personally defend claims 
in a remote forum in a foreign language.  While, to be sure, 
the jurisdictional question in that case is different from the 
question before us, the District Court was entitled to take 
judicial notice of Shulman’s reasons when disputing personal 
jurisdiction.  If it is such a burden for him to address a lawsuit 
in a neighboring United States jurisdiction in the English 
language, it seriously undermines an argument that his forum 
choice in this case was motivated by his convenience. 
3
 Plaintiffs’ strong reliance on the conduct underlying the 
Warren plant and equipment purchase in Pennsylvania is 
misplaced, as explained in the District Court’s discussion of 
the private interest factors.  Shulman claims that much of the 
evidence of that fraud, including relevant witnesses, exists in 
Pennsylvania.  However, Sapir does not dispute that the 
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in crediting the unrebutted declaration of an Israeli lawyer 
stating that documents in English would not have to be 
translated into Hebrew in an Israeli court.  Finally, the 
convenience of counsel in a matter is not a relevant factor.  
See Solomon v. Cont'l Am. Life Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 1043, 1047 
(3d Cir. 1973).
4
  The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that plaintiffs did not make a strong 
showing of convenience and therefore affording lesser 
deference to their choice of forum.  
 
  B.  “Oppressiveness and Vexation” 
 Having concluded that the District Court did not err in 
according lesser deference to plaintiffs’ choice of forum, we 
turn to whether it abused its discretion when weighing the 
private and public interest factors in determining if plaintiffs’ 
                                                                                                             
actual purchase price of the plant and equipment was 
approximately $6.6 million.  Rather, he argues that Shulman 
knew the actual purchase price, as it was discussed during 
negotiations, and the alleged additional $6.4 million received 
by Sapir was consideration for separate business deals—that 
there was, in other words, no misrepresentation.  It appears, 
therefore, that much of the evidence that exists in 
Pennsylvania—such as the wires and witnesses that can 
authenticate them—has been admitted by Sapir.   Sapir’s 
defense apparently relies on what happened during the 
negotiation of the deal, in Israel.   
4
 Defendants also argue that plaintiffs engaged in forum 
shopping to take advantage of the favorable United States 
laws, particularly RICO.  The District Court declined to make 
a finding of forum shopping and did not consider it in its 
convenience analysis.  Nevertheless, it is at least worth noting 
that the possibility of a treble damages award under RICO—
and the unavailability of such remedy in Israel—may have, at 
least in part, motivated plaintiffs to choose a United States 
forum.  See Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 416 
F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting possibility of forum-
shopping motives based on availability of RICO awards 
despite lack of district court findings).  This, of course, would 
further support a presumption that plaintiffs’ forum choice 
was not based on convenience. 
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chosen forum would cause “oppressiveness and vexation to a 
defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s 
convenience.”  Koster, 330 U.S. at 524.  When seeking 
dismissal on grounds of  forum non conveniens, a defendant 
must show that the balance of public and private factors “tips 
decidedly in favor of trial in the foreign forum.”  Lacey v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“Lacey II”).   
 
 As an initial matter, plaintiffs argue that the District 
Court erred as a matter of law in failing to apply the 
“oppressiveness and vexation”  standard.  This argument is 
without merit.  While the R&R did not specifically mention 
those words, the Magistrate Judge’s analysis and the District 
Court’s opinion adopting the R&R clearly reflect that the 
appropriate standard was applied.  Moreover, the District 
Court, when adopting and supplementing the R&R, explicitly 
acknowledged this standard when overruling plaintiffs’ 
objection that the Magistrate Judge “faile[ed] to apply the 
‘oppressiveness and vexation’ standard.”  (A00055.)  
Although the District Court did not engage in a lengthy 
discussion of “oppressiveness and vexation,” its thorough 
analysis of the private and public interest factors and its 
findings reflect a correct understanding of the standard and 
permits our appellate review of the Court’s “actual 
consideration and analysis.”  Windt, 529 F.3d at 196 (stating 
that District Court’s failure to state correct “oppressiveness 
and vexation” standard was not error when it correctly 
applied the standard and permitted meaningful appellate 
review).   
 
  1.  Private Interest Factors 
 Plaintiffs argue that the District Court abused its 
discretion in its assessment of the private interest factors.   To 
reiterate, private interests include such things as ease of 
access to sources of proof, ability to compel witness 
attendance, and other potential obstacles to a cost-effective 
and expeditious trial.  Delta Air Lines, Inc., 619 F.3d at 296.   
 
 The parties go through lengthy discussions of the 
witnesses, their countries of residence, their preferred 
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languages, and the facts to which each may testify.  We need 
not scrutinize all of these materials to perform our function of 
appellate review, nor was it necessary for the District Court to 
have done so.  See id. at 299-300 (“The Supreme Court has 
rejected the suggestion that defendants seeking forum non 
conveniens dismissal must submit affidavits identifying the 
witnesses they would call and the testimony these would 
provide if the trial were held in the alternative forum, 
explaining that such detail is not necessary.  Rather, the 
defendant must provide enough information to enable the 
District Court to balance the parties’ interests.” (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted)).   
 
 It suffices to say that Shulman identifies several 
witnesses located in the United States with knowledge of the 
various deals, while Sapir identifies nearly twenty witnesses 
located abroad, the majority of whom live in Israel, the 
country of residence of both Sapir and Shulman.  Sapir 
contends that Shulman’s witnesses in the United States will 
testify to facts not in dispute, such as the purchase price of the 
Warren plant and equipment and the fact that $500,000 was 
never paid to one Bob Stump in connection with this 
purchase.  Rather, Sapir’s defense is that Shulman knew the 
actual purchase price and that the witnesses with information 
regarding the actual negotiation of the disputed deals are 
located in Israel or live closer to Israel.  Shulman also argues, 
without any authority, that there are roughly 18,700 pages of 
documents in English that would need to be translated into 
Hebrew in an Israeli forum.  As noted above, Sapir provided 
the declaration of an Israeli lawyer, asserting that documents 
in English need not be translated because Israel courts are 
typically proficient in English.
5
        
                                                 
5
 Plaintiffs also object to the District Court’s consideration of 
defendant Sapir’s medical issues.  Sapir submitted a 
declaration stating that he suffers from antiphospholipid 
syndrome which prevents him from flying long distances and 
that traveling to the United States would cause severe health 
risks.  The District Court, however, with the competing 
affidavits of doctors from both sides, declined to conclusively 
resolve the issue and instead based its decision on other 
private interests.  We do not address it further.  
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 The location of the parties, their witnesses, and the 
availability of evidence favor resolution in Israel.  The 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
the private interest factors weighed in favor of dismissal.  
 
  2.  Public Interest Factors 
 Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court erred in 
weighing the public interest factors because it applied the 
wrong standard, citing Lacey II for the proposition that absent 
a showing that the private interest factors impose 
oppressiveness or vexation, a defendant must show the public 
interest factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal.  Plaintiffs 
misstate the relevant test: To prevail on a forum non 
conveniens motion, “the movant must show that the balance 
of these [private and public interest] factors tips decidedly in 
favor of trial in the foreign forum.”  Lacey II, 932 F.2d at 180 
(emphasis added).   
 
 Plaintiffs contend that there is no congestion in the 
chosen district, that there is a strong federal interest in 
plaintiffs’ choice of forum, that a United States jury has a 
strong interest in the case, that Pennsylvania law will apply, 
that the locus of the culpable conduct occurred in 
Pennsylvania, and that the District Court has already invested 
substantial resources in the case.   
 
 As the District Court noted, however, Shulman and 
Sapir met in Israel, discussed and negotiated the purchase of 
the Warren plant and equipment in Israel, discussed the coal 
deals in Israel, and most interactions with each other took 
place in Israel, Monaco or the Ukraine, not in Pennsylvania 
(or even in the United States).  Other than the actual wire 
payments and Shulman’s law firm, there appears to be no 
other connection to Pennsylvania, and little else to the United 
States.  The District Court further concluded that there had 
been no apparent progress made in the case.  As to the other 
factors, the District Court found the choice-of-law issue 
potentially complicated and did not address it.  See id. at 187 
n.14 (“[I]n resolving a forum  non conveniens motion, the 
district court is not required to predict what law the foreign 
court would apply.”).  It also correctly noted that not every 
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public interest factor need weigh in favor of dismissal.   
 
 Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that public interest factors weighed in 
favor of dismissal.   
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 The order of the District Court dismissing the action 
on forum non conveniens grounds will be affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
